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abstract
OBJECTIVES: The aim of this paper is to analyse Baltic security developments from U.S. 
government and military resources, scholarly journal articles, and multinational public policy 
research institute assessments.
METHODS: The aim is to analyse the content and rhetoric within these resources to learn how 
those producing these materials view Baltic security developments and their viewpoints on how the 
U.S. and its allies should respond to these developments focusing on increasing Russian regional 
assertiveness.
RESULTS: The author provides interpretations of Baltic security developments, Russian Baltic 
policy, and U.S. and NATO responses to these developments in materials produced by U.S. 
civilian and military policymakers and multinational scholarly analysis. Includes performance 
assessments of U.S. programs including the European Deterrence Initiative and potential Russian 
military activity in the Baltics as reflected in varying reports by the U.S. Government, military, 
and multinational public policy research institutions.
CONCLUSIONS: In conclusion, the author recommends that U.S. and NATO countries 
recognize a new Cold War exists with a revisionist Russia and also advocates continuing 
NATO military exercises, upgrading civilian and military infrastructure protection, and 
enhancing U.S. and allied preparedness. The author also urges ongoing and candid dialogue 
between NATO and Russia to keep this situation from erupting into war. Insists the U.S. and its 
allies adroitly respond to Russian attempts to influence and manipulate public opinion toward 
Moscow. Finally, the author expresses concern that 
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U.S. partisan division over the 2016 Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election makes 
achieving greater Baltic policy cohesion difficult. Advocates warning Russia of devastating consequences 
of attempts to militarily invade or subvert Baltic countries.
Keywords: European Deterrence Initiative, Baltic Security, geopolitics, Russia, European 
security, U.S. national security policy, NATO security policy.
Introduction
Throughout its history the Baltic Sea region has been a source of extensive international 
trade and geopolitical importance (North and Kronenberg 2016). Countries surrounding 
the Baltic include Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania and these countries and Iceland and Norway are members of the Council 
of Baltic Sea States (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
1973, Council of the Baltic Sea States 2017, Kyle 2018, pp. 104-115). Following World 
War I, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania enjoyed two decades of independence before the 
cataclysm of World War II saw these three countries absorbed by the former Soviet 
Union until they regained their independence in 1990. These countries have made steady 
economic and social progress becoming integrated into western political structures 
including the NATO alliance in 2004 (North and Kronenberg, Giguère 2007, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017).
However, recent years have seen a reassertion of Russian nationalism under President 
Vladimir Putin which has sought to test NATO’s resolve to defend its strategic interests. 
Russia’s 2007 cyber attack against Estonia (McGuiness 2017, Herzog 2011, pp. 49-60), 
its intervention in Georgia in 2008, the forcible annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 
2014 (Kuhn 2018), and aggressive Russian flyovers by two Russian Sukhoi Su-24 and 
a KA-28 Felix helicopter against the U.S. Navy’s guided missile destroyer USS Donald 
Cook in the Baltic on April 11-12, 2016 has made the Baltics an increasingly important 
area of political emphasis, financial commitment and security interest for the U.S. over 
the last five years (U.S. Navy 2016, pp. 1-2, Milevski 2018, U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging 
Threats 2017, Scheer 2019, pp. 10-17, Béraud-Sedreau and Giegerich 2018, 53-74). 
Increasing U.S. Government and military interest in and international scholary analysis 
of Baltic Sea security topics is reflected in governmental rhetoric, political debate, 
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financial investment, and public policy research institute literature since 2014 and will 
now be examined. This work hypothesizes that American governmental and military 
policy research analysis can provide beneficial guidance to those studying Baltic security 
matters. It recognizes that the content of this rhetoric and literature can be limited by 
partisan political bias and analytical and methodological deficiencies in such research. 
This article reflects a realist perspective and recommendations supportive of a more 
assertive U.S. and NATO posture toward Russian activity in this region based on 
governmental, military, and public policy research institute analysis of Baltic security 
matters.
presidential Rhetoric-Presidential statements and proclamations are often authoritative 
indicators of U.S. policy stances on public policy issues coming from the U.S. 
Government’s most senior leadership. Meeting with Estonian President Toomas Hendrik 
Ilves in Tallinn on September 3, 2014, former President Barack Obama stressed the 
importance of the U.S.’ NATO commitment to the Baltic countries, praised Estonian 
soldiers service in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, and Iraq, and noted his 
administration was working with Congress to increase the U.S. Baltic military presence 
including bringing additional Air Force units and aircraft to the Nordic-Baltic region for 
training purposes (The President’s News Conference with President Toomas Hendrik Ilves… 
2014, pp. 1,3).
In a May 13, 2016 White House meeting with Nordic leaders, Obama claimed:
“We are united in our concern about Russia’s growing aggressive military presence and 
posture in the Baltic-Nordic region. We will be maintaining ongoing dialogue and seek 
cooperation with Russia, but we also want to make sure that we are prepared and strong, 
and we want to encourage Russia to keep its military activities in full compliance with 
international obligations” (Joint Statement of the United States-Nordic Leaders Summit 
… 2016, pp. 1-2). In their joint statement, these leaders reaffirmed their support for 
the Baltic States interest to strengthen regional security and stability and to leverage 
their collective capacities to withstand Russian hybrid threats and enhance political, 
economic, and military assets for strengthening national and regional resilience (Joint 
Statement of the United States-Nordic Leaders Summit… 2016, p. 1).
This support for Baltic security continued into the Trump Administration. Attending 
NATO’s July 2016 summit in Warsaw, Trump praised Poland’s historic and contemporary 
role in defending European freedom, lauded Poland’s decision to purchase the U.S.’ 
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Patriot air and missile defense system, and urged NATO countries to meet their financial 
obligations to militarily support NATO security during a speech in Krasiński Square. 
One analysis of this speech stressed the symbolic importance of it being made at the 
site of the monument to the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, the importance of Poland and the 
Baltic Sea Region to European security, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO, 
and reminding Russia of the U.S.’ awareness of this region’s history (Remarks in Warsaw, 
Poland… 2017, pp. 1-7, Thieme 2018, pp. 149-153).
Trump’s support for Baltic security was reaffirmed during an Ap ril 3, 2018 Wh ite 
House meeting with Baltic Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid of Estonia, Rajmonds Vejonis 
of Latvia, and Dalia Grybauskaitė of Lithuania. This meeting saw Trump announce 
that the U.S. intended to provide nearly $100 million for these countries to purchase 
large-caliber ammunition; over $70 million in training and equipping programs to 
enhance these countries military force national capacity building; and that more than  
5,000 U.S. forces will join multinational forces participating in the Baltic region’s 2018 
Saber Strike exercise. Additional summit actions include the U.S. seeking to enhance 
Baltic energy infrastructure by providing expertise to prevent, detect, thwart, and recover 
from hostile cyberattacks; offering technical assistance to support energy diversification 
projects including synchronizing Baltic and European electric grids; providing  
$3 million to enable the Baltic countries to build public and institutional resiliency 
against disinformation by strengthening independent media outlets, public service 
broadcasters, and regional media literacy skills; and also promoting the centennial 
of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian independence through various educational 
and exchange programs (Joint Statement: A Declaration to Celebrate A 100 Years of 
Independence… 2018, pp. 1-3, McNamara 2017, pp. 73-98).
congressional action
The U.S. Congress is also a major partner in U.S. Baltic regional policy through its 
debates, legislative, funding, and oversight responsibilities deriving from Article 1 
of the U.S. Constitution (Chapman 2016, pp. 85-86). Congress seeks to influence 
U.S. policy through resolutions, debates, legislation, holding oversight hearings, and 
approving funding and requiring federal agencies to report on activities implementing 
congressionally enacted legislation. On June 4, 2015, Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) 
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expressed concern over the existing law prohibiting U.S. petroleum exports at a time 
when U.S. domestic energy production was increasing, recent incidents of Russian 
energy coercion against Europe such as Russia cutting off natural gas to Ukraine and 
other Eastern European countries in January 2009, and the dependence many NATO 
countries have on Russia for oil and natural gas resources (Congressional Record 2015 
p. S3766). An example of Congress expressing its displeasure with Russian aggression
was Senate Resolution 501 introduced on June 28, 2016 which criticized the overflights
of the USS Donald Cook, and a Russian SU-27 fighter doing a barrel roll over a U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft flying in international airspace over the Baltic on April 14, 2016
while calling on Russia to cease provocative military maneuvers endangering U.S. and
allied military forces (S. Res. 501 2016).
Witnesses testifying at a June 23, 2016 briefing held by the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) noted a recent groundbreaking ceremony that 
began construction of an Aegis ballistic missile defense base in Redzikowo, Poland, 
a quadrupling of the European Reassurance Initiative’s (ERI) budget, the concern 
expressed over Russian military aircraft not turning their transponders on during 
interactions with western military aircraft, the belief expressed that Finland and Sweden 
could join NATO tomorrow if they chose to, and that over 20 European nations planned 
to increase their defense spending stemming from increasing Russian aggressiveness 
(U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2016, pp. 4, 7, 16, 18, 21).
A July 7, 2016 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing saw Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) comment that NATO had deployed a Rapid Reaction Force, increased air 
policing and sea patrols, and moved more forces and equipment toward the Baltic Sea 
states while expressing anger that some European officials had criticized these measured 
responses as being “saber-rattling or warmongering.” Witness Julianne Smith of the 
Center for a New American Security stressed that there would be more Russian military 
air and sea probing in the Nordic-Baltic Region and beyond and thought Vladimir 
Putin would be emboldened to engage in additional coercive acts if he saw the EU 
and NATO as weak and unraveling, and that the U.S. needed to bolster deterrence, 
reassure allies, and send a stronger signal to Putin about the alliance’s collective resolve 
(U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services 2017, pp. 4, 25).
A December 7, 2016 CSCE briefing saw Rand Corporation witness Michael Johnson 
note former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove stating that 
“Russia has chosen to be an adversary and imposes a long-term existential threat to 
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the United States and our European allies and partners.” Johnson also stressed that 
a long supply chain of over 5,000 miles by sea for the U.S. has to provide military 
reinforcement in Eastern Europe; stressed that the U.S. Army has only nine brigades 
which are U.S.-based and fewer than the number of U.S. aircraft carriers; and that 
Russian long-range surface-to-air missiles, submarines, and anti-ship missiles make it too 
dangerous to directly deploy forces to the Baltics. He stressed that getting these forces 
from Germany to the battlefield is problematic due to insufficient Eastern European 
transportation infrastructure for battle tanks and that there are insufficient logistic 
hubs for fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and medical services with these Germany-based 
services designed to sustain combat from 100 miles during the Cold War.
He stressed that despite the Ukrainian conflict and a poor readiness rate, Russia could 
still generate 26 battalion tactical groups in their Western Military District with three 
to seven days warning. Johnson concluded by saying that NATO’s chances could be 
improved by adding three armored brigades to four infantry brigades capable of fighting 
at short warning to change combat outcomes. An effect of this would enable these forces 
to delay a Russian advance, retreat to defend national capitals, and use existing stocks of 
ammunition and fuel to give time for NATO reinforcements to provide assistance (U.S. 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2017, pp. 5, 7, 9).
During a March 1, 2017 House Armed Services Committee subcommittee hearing, Rep. 
Michael Turner (R-OH) noted that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Joseph Dunford 
had said “Russia represents the greatest threat to our national security…[what] they seek 
to do is to undermine the credibility of our ability to meet our alliance commitments to 
NATO.” Witness Andres Hunter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) stressed the operational and tactical challenges of Russian Anti-Access Aerial 
Denial (A2/AD) capabilities to U.S. ground forces, noted that substantial Russian 
investment in ground combat systems narrows the U.S. advantage in this area and that 
Moscow has gained pre-eminence in artillery and rocket systems. He noted such advanced 
capabilities, combined with shorter internal Russian communication lines, also challenge 
U.S. ground forces; and Russian non-kinetic capabilities in electronic warfare, cyber 
operations, and information operations significantly transcend U.S. Army capabilities in 
a potential conflict and potentially undermine U.S. intelligence and anti-armor system 
effectiveness threatening the U.S.’ and NATO’s ability to operate effectively as a coalition 
(U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and 
Land Forces 2017, pp. 1, 7-8).
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A March 22, 2017 House Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee hearing saw Rep. 
Brad Sherman (D-CA) maintain that Baltic countries should spend 4% of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) on defense while complaining that only one Baltic state meets 
the NATO requirement of spending 2% of GDP on defense. Witness Paul Goble of 
the Institute of World Politics maintained that Russia would not send its tanks over 
the Baltic countries borders as long as they are part of NATO, while also stressing the 
importance of these countries successfully integrating Russian ethnic minorities into 
their societies. Conversely, witness Lisa Sawyer Stamp of CSIS stressed that the U.S.’ 
European combat presence was a full brigade strength below what it was during 2012, 
that NATO’s largest post-Cold War exercise included 30,000 troops, and that Russia’s 
planned Zapad exercise in 2017 could include up to 200,000 personnel (U.S. Congress, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging 
Threats 2017, pp. 5, 7-8, 14).
A March 28, 2017 House Armed Services Committee hearing on Russian military 
activities and European security challenges saw committee Chair Rep. Mac Thornberry 
(R-TX) assert: Meanwhile the Russians continue to invest in their nuclear weapons, 
their anti-access/aerial denial capability, and in a variety of other capabilities de signed 
to reduce or eliminate any technological military advantage that the United States may 
have had in the past. We know that one of their primary goals is to divide and weaken 
NATO….arguably the most successful military alliance ever (U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Armed Services 2017, p. 1).
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) commander General Curtis Scaparroti stressed 
that EUCOM had identified intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
collection platforms to improve timely threat information and strategic warning, land 
force capabilities to deter further Russian aggression, enhanced naval capabilities for 
antisubmarine warfare; pre-positioned equipment to increase crisis responsiveness; 
and enhanced missile defense systems as critical focus areas. Scaparotti also told this 
committee’s ranking member Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) that the U.S. needed greater 
forces there including a rotational or rotational enduring land footprint such as an 
armored division; stressed the Air Force’s posture was very capable but needed fifth 
generation aircraft; and that the Navy needed to upgrade its antisubmarine warfare 
capabilities (U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services 2017, pp. 3-5).
Congressional discussion and analysis of Baltic security matters can also occur through 
legislation and debate on the House and Senate floors. On March 28, 2017, Rep. John 
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Shimkus (R-IL) noted concerns that Baltic countries had about a nuclear power plant 
being constructed in Belarus and run by Rosatom, the state-owned Russian nuclear 
company. Shimkus stressed that Belarus had ignored four of the six reviewed steps 
recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent nuclear disasters 
like Chernobyl and Fukushima, that Belarus and Lithuania are Espoo Convention 
signatories which calls for member states to consult with bordering countries about 
such projects, allow experts to review project information, and share information 
with bordering countries about the safety and security of these projects. The plant is  
12.5 miles from the Lithuanian border and in sight of Vilnius. Nearly all of Lithuania 
is within 186 miles of this plant and would be affected if a disaster occurred such as 
contamination spilling into the Neris River which is a key Lithuanian water supply 
source. Shimkus also criticized Belarus for not telling Lithuania about four accidents 
which occurred at this plant during 2016, including a 330-ton nuclear reactor shell 
being dropped from a height of 13 feet (Congressional Record 2017, p. H2468, Stravers 
2018, pp. 541-556).
In comments inserted into the Congressional Record on May 18, 2017, Rep. Christopher 
Smith (R-NJ) criticized Russia for violating central commitments of the Helsinki Final 
Act including the territorial integrity of states and noting that Russian aggression is not 
geographically restricted but threatens the entire region. He emphasized that Russia 
has forcefully seized sovereign territory, threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons 
against other countries, harassed U.S. and NATO military assets, and abandoned 
key transparency measures and commitments. Smith praised the ERI which has seen 
NATO members hold over 1,000 military exercises since 2014 and enabled U.S. forces 
to participate more actively in these exercises and urged continued enhancement of 
NATO’s conventional deterrent in Poland and the Baltic States (Congressional Record 
2017, pp. E669-670).
June 7, 2017 saw a bipartisan group of four Representatives introduce H.R. 2820 
the Fight Russia Corruption Act which was referred to the House Foreign Affairs and 
Intelligence Committees. This legislation stressed how countries adjoining Russia were 
threatened by Moscow’s military aggression and hybrid warfare strategy of using direct 
and indirect action to coerce, destabilize, and exert malign influence over them. It called 
for creating an Office of  Anti-Corruption Re lating to  Russian Financial Activities in  
Europe within the State Department. Additional provisions of this proposed legislation 
called for analyzing Russian financial networks operating in European countries with 
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investments in real estate, energy, media, and other sectors, elevating anti-corruption 
as an element of NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, requiring NATO’s Assistant Secretary 
General for Intelligence and Warning to monitor Russian influence in NATO 
member states, and prioritizing combating Russian influence in the NATO-European 
framework. It would also require the Director of National Intelligence to prepare 
a National Intelligence Estimate on purchases made by individuals and organizations of 
key European sectors providing monopolistic control of a sector and detailed analysis 
of individuals and organizations making such purchases including their revenue sources 
and links to the Russian Federation. This legislation was not enacted during the 116th 
Congress (2017-2018) although it had 22 House co-sponsors at the end of 2017 
(H.R. 2820, 115th Congress, 1st Session, History of Bills 2017).
During a June 28, 2017 Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, witness Nicholas Burns 
of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, noted that Russia was seeking to expand 
its influence over its neighbors and reduce global U.S. power and influence by seeking to 
manipulate elections in many countries and consistently harassing NATO allies including 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This hearing also saw Janis Sarts of NATO’s Strategic 
Communications Center of Excellence note that Russian election meddling involved 
financing pro-Russian candidates and political parties by offering Kremlin media as 
a platform in Estonia’s 2009 European Parliament elections, by conducting cyber attacks 
against candidates Russia perceives as hostile, and engaging in malicious disinformation 
using social media bots and pro-Kremlin media outlets. Sarts also maintained that Baltic 
countries were particularly concerned about the Russian military’s 2017 Operation 
Zapad exercises (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2017, 
pp. 7, 31, 70, 80-82, Kragh and Åsberg 2017, pp. 777-816).
US/nato countervailing actions
Concern over possible Russian irredentism toward the Baltic countries has been 
prevalent for many years and reflected in NATO policymaking. NATO Air Policing 
seeks to maintain the airspace of NATO alliance members. Contributions come from all 
member countries and include national air surveillance systems, air traffic management, 
interceptor aircraft, and other air defence measures. This policing involves the use of 
the Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS) and appropriate Quick Reaction Air 
Security and Defence Quarterly
ISSN 2300-8741 eISSN 2544-994X
2019 September Volume 26 Number 4 
https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/112252
intercept of fast jets. This policing responds to military or civilian aircraft in distress 
and to aircraft not following international flight regulations and approaching NATO 
airspace. These Air Policing facilities are based at Uedem, Germany, and Torrejon, Spain 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2019b, pp. 1-3).
NATO has also developed an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) consisting of four 
multinational battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Leadership of 
these battle groups is provided by Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and United 
States. These entities are multinational and combat ready and seek to demonstrate 
that an attack against one NATO member is an attack against all NATO members 
while also representing the largest collective NATO collective defence reinforcement in  
a generation (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2019a, p. 1).
NATO’s Response Force (NRF) was created in 2002 and is a technologically advanced, 
multinational force consisting of rapidly deployable land, air, maritime, and Special 
Operations Forces. The NRF provides a collective defence and rapid military response to 
an emerging crisis, execute peace-support operations, protects critical infrastructure, and 
supports disaster relief. It is based at Brunssum, the Netherlands and Naples, Italy and 
its four components include a Command and Control Element; Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force (VJTF), an Initial Follow on Forces Group capable of deploying 
quickly following the VJTF in response to a crisis, and a Response Forces Pool (RFP) 
featuring multispectrum military capabilities including command and control, combat, 
and support units from a wider pool of national military forces. A Spearhead Force was 
created in NRF following the 2014 Wales Summit to better respond to the changing 
security environment on NATO’s eastern and southern borders (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 2018).
An additional component of NATO’s response to potential Russian caused security 
contingencies in the Baltic is the 30/30/30/30 plan. This would require NATO to have 
30 land battalions, 30 air fighter squadrons, and 30 ships ready to deploy within 30days 
of being put on alert. This plan was established at the February 2018 NATO summit in 
Brussels with the intention of answering U.S. criticisms that NATO members do not 
have sufficient capabilities to counter Russia and to develop a war plan for countering 
Russia (Emott and Ali 2018, Muṅoz 2019).
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european Reassurance/Deterrence Initiative
U.S. policymakers in Congress and the executive branch responded to Russian aggression 
in eastern Europe by enacting the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in 2014 which 
has become the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). This statute authorized the 
Secretary of Defense to spend up to $1 billion for the following purposes:
1. Increasing the presence of U.S. armed forces in Europe.
2. Bilateral and multilateral military exercises and training with European allies and
partner nations.
3. Improving European infrastructure to enhance U.S. military responsiveness.
4. Enhancing the European prepositioning of U.S. armed forces equipment.
5. Building the defense and security capacity of European allied and partner nations
(Public Law 113-291 2014, p. 3618, Mὂlder 2011, pp. 143-168).
An August 22, 2017, a Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) report 
on ERI determined that ERI funds augment country military capacity building and 
enhance interoperability and responsiveness, but risk sustainability since support for 
ERI imposes new requirements on EUCOM without an equivalent increase in force 
authorization, and stresses diminishing personnel resources. Such fundsare budgeted as 
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) which only last one year in contrast to DOD’s 
five year Future Years Defense Programming planning cycle identifying immediate base 
budget priorities and future projections for the next four fiscal years. Consequently, 
EUCOM and Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) countries may be unable to sustain 
ERI contributions to allied and partner military capabilities (U.S. Department of 
Defense, Office of Inspector General 2017, pp. 7, 11).
Baltic country specific funding requests made by DOD include enhancing intelligence 
interoperability and readiness and include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 
ERI funds have also pay travel costs of National Guard instructors and enable Maryland 
National Guard personnel to train Estonian soldiers to direct NATO and U.S. fighter 
aircraft against enemy targets, and improving the flow of military equipment and supplies 
across European national borders.These funds also support Baltic country training with 
anti-tank weapons, surveillance systems, and forward air-control procedures for fighter 
aircraft in Estonia, and providing $11 million for 2016’s Operation Saber Strike in the 
Baltics (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General 2017, pp. 13-17, 
Ǎtland 2016, pp. 163-176).
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Recommendations from the DODIG report for improving ERI’s effectiveness include:
1. The Director of the Joint Staff assessing competing mission and personnel priorities of 
the ERI to determine whether EUCOM and subordinate commands have sufficient
personnel resources to execute ERI’s mission.
2. The Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense developing options for changes to
the ERI budgeting cycle to better align with and support allied and partner-nation
training and capacity-building activities.
3. EUCOM’s Commander consider developing and establishing command process to
assess the impact of ERI funds on exercises, training, infrastructure improvement,
and activities supporting building allied and partner capacity.
4. EUCOM’s Commander integrating the newly deployed U.S. Armored Brigade
Combat Team and the four NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battalions into
OAR countries exercises and training to ensure ongoing ERI collaboration and
interoperability.
5. Complete theater-wide operations plans to inform decisions for ERI support to fill
training gaps in OAR countries national training plans and convey a coordinated
and unified message to allied and partner countries (U.S. Department of Defense,
Office of Inspector General 2017, pp. 20-21, 38, 46-47).
Additional critical assessments of ERI were provided by Congress’ Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in December 2017 and January 2018. The December 2017 
report determined that DOD had not prioritized ERI-funded posture initiatives against 
those in its base estimate; estimated their sustainment costs; or communicated future 
costs to Congress. GAO maintained that DOD has not used existing processes to plan 
for fund ERI posture initiatives; and that it does not communicate to Congress future 
costs of enduring ERI activities through OCO with DOD contending that providing 
such costs is outside its budgeting and programming processes (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2017, pp. 11-20).
GAO recommendations to DOD in this report include:
1. DOD prioritizing ERI posture initiatives relative to those funded in its base budget
relative to established posture planning processes.
2. DOD directing EUCOM and military services to develop estimates for sustaining
prepositioned equipment and other ERI infrastructure projects and ensure the
services plan for these long-term costs in future budgets.
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3. DOD providing Congress in its annual budget submission with estimates of future
costs for ERI posture funded initiatives and other enduring costs including level of
host nation support and burden sharing (U.S. Government Accountability Office
2017, p. 21).
The January 2018 GAO report stressed the role of OCO funding in military operations. It 
mentioned that the Army separately tracks OCO funds designated for base requirements 
through its financial system and that ERI funds are issued separately and can only be 
reported as obligated for the purpose issued. Similar use and tracking of OCO funds 
also occurs in other U.S. armed service branches (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office 2018, p. 17).
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 (October 1, 2017-September 30, 2018) budget request for 
ERI was $4.8 billion as opposed to $3.4 billion for FY 2017. Elements of EUCOM’s 
plan to implement ERI include:
• Increased Presence ($1.732.7 billion)-Proposing a more robust U.S. European
presence for defense and deterrence.
• Exercises and Training ($217.7 million)-Increasing training to improve Alliance and
partner forces readiness and interoperability.
• Enhanced Prepositioning ($2.221.8 billion)-Strategically placing assets allow
EUCOM to more efficiently conduct daily activities while also supporting rapid in
theater force deployment.
• Improved Infrastructure ($337.8 million)-Facilitating infrastructure improvements
expanding readiness and U.S. actions and priorities.
• Building Partnership Capacity ($267.3 million)-Improving operations with allies and
partners strengthening their ability to defend themselves (U.S. European Command
2017, p. 1).
ERI became the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) as a result of Public Law 115-91 
the FY 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 115-91 2017, p. 1283). 
In its FY 2019 congressional budget submission, DOD requested $6.531.4 billion 
for EDI reflecting increasing concern over countering Russian security threats and 
reflecting the Trump Administration’s emphasis on great power competition instead 
of counterterrorism prompting DOD defense force structure and decision making. 
The FY 2020 congressional budget submission saw DOD request $5.910.6 billion for 
EDI representing incremental spending increases for this initiative (U.S. Department 
of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2019, p. 1, 
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U.S. Department of Defense 2018, pp. 2-4, U.S. European Command 2017, p. 1, U.S. 
European Command 2019, p. 1).
This document called for EUCOM supporting an average approximate active, reserve, 
and National Guard personnel strength of approximately 9,903 with 9,095 Army, 350 
Navy, and 458 Air Force personnel. These will participate in multiple theater activities 
including temporary presence or strengthening allied/partner capacity during planned 
exercises, expanding the size and scope of planned exercises for enhancing NATO 
interoperability, and supporting EUCOM’s Joint Exercise Program and Joint Multi-
National Readiness Center training events.
Additional budget requests amounts contained in this document for Baltic relevant 
applications include:
Table 1. Military Construction, Army-Provides details for congressional oversight and 
funding of these programs and enhancing public awareness of U.S. spending on Baltic 
security matters
Staging Area Zagan, Poland $51 million
Rail Extension & Railhead Powidz, Poland $14 million
Ammunition Storage Facility Powidz, Poland $52 million
Rail Extension & Railhead Swietoszow, Poland $6.4 million
Bulk Fuel Storage Powdidz, Poland $21 million
Table 2. Military Construction, Defense-Wide-Provides details for congressional oversight 
and funding of these programs and enhancing public awareness of U.S. spending on Baltic 
security matters
Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Operations Facility
Ämari, Estonia $6.1 million
SOF Training Facility Ämari, Estonia $9.6 million (U.S. Department of 
Defense, Office of the Undersecretary 
of Defense (Comptroller) 2018, p. 25, 
Hunzecker 2016, pp. 12-18).
Table 3. Additional ERI force enhancements broken down by armed service branches 
and geographic location in this budget request include:
Increased Presence Persistent presence of air, land, and 
sea forces in Europe-NATO Article 5 
Commitment
$1.874.7 billion
Army Rotational Forces Ensures U.S. presence across Eastern 
Europe including Baltic States
$921.3 million
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Army Aviation Rotation Supporting Combat Aviation Brigade 
including an Armed Reconnaissance (AH-
64) and Assault Battalion (UH-60)
$100.1 million




cruise missile and unmanned aircraft 
surveillance facilities. Develops integrated 
air and missile defense architecture for 
EUCOM through modeling, simulation, 
and interoperability with partner nations 
and allies
$3.3 million
Intelligence Enhancements Providing ISR capability to enhance 
indications & warning and interoperability
$41.9 million.
Navy Theater Anti-Submarine 
Warfare
Supports EUCOM operations through 
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System 
(IUSS) infrastructure improvement, 
operational support, and battlespace 
preparation
$85.2 million
Marine Corps Rotational Force 
Support
Enables Marine Corps rotational forces to 
increase scope of engagements with NATO 
allies
$29 million
Air Force Retain Air 
Superiority Presence
Supporting increased EUCOM missions 
by retaining F-15C/D aircraft in 493rd 
Fighter Squadron at Royal Air Force Base 
Lakenheath. Provides funding for support 
squadron operations and weapons system 
sustainment
$106 million
Air Force Intelligence 
Enhancements
Providing ISR Capability to enhance 
indications and warning, intelligence 
preparation of the operational 
environment, providing intelligence data 
via cross domain solutions including 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 
operations
$72.4 million
Persistent Mobility Air Force 
(MAF) Capability
Continued MAF training and exercises 




Maintaining dedicated analytic support to 
provide timely intelligence and warning 
along with exercise planning. Respond 
to the rapidly changing theater security 





Supporting efforts to build partnership 
capacity and enhance SOF ability to 
advise, assist, and train allies and partner 
nations while simultaneously integrating, 
collaborating, and synchronizing analytical 
and intelligence operational requirements
$27.1 million (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 
Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) 2018,  
pp. 2-7, Deni 2019,  
pp. 92-103)
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It remains to be seen to what extent Congress will fund DOD EDI requests. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the DOD is seeking significant increases in funding for EDI is an unequivocal 
demonstration of the Trump Administration’s commitment to enhancing Baltic security 
by increasing tangible military assistance to NATO and partner countries in the Baltic 
region. The spending data presented here reflects the Trump Administration’s intent to 
increase multispectrum defense capabilities in the Baltic.
U.S. military assessments
Various U.S. military branches also recognize the importance of the Baltic to emerging 
U.S. national security interests, with this being reflected in their analyses of European 
geopolitical trends since 2014. A 2016 compilation published by National Defense 
University Press noted that Russian leaders could engage in military intervention to 
“protect” Russian minorities in neighboring states such as the Baltics, that Russian 
territorial seizure of territory in the Baltics would impose a military escalation burden 
on the United States including using nuclear weapons, that NATO countries must strike 
a delicate balance between reassuring Baltic allies and deterring Russian miscalculation 
while also calming tensions, and noting that Russia has recently deployed short-range 
SS-26 Iskander ballistic missiles to Kaliningrad adjacent to the Baltics. This work 
asserted that Russian attempts to destabilize the Baltics with a Crimean variant hybrid 
operation could result in NATO’s Article 5 being invoked, that Russia could overrun 
the Baltic countries within 48-72 hours but with the price of prompting a NATO 
response that Moscow could not maintain and shake Finnish and Swedish neutrality, 
that NATO battalions should have forward-based ground units possessing short-range 
air defense capability and the ability to eliminate offensive Russian military action from 
Putin’s strategic calculus, that Russian air defenses at Kaliningrad, Severomorsk, and 
St. Petersburg cover airspace encompassing and endangering Finland, the Baltic States, 
northern and southern Sweden, northern Norway, Poland, and eastern Germany, and 
the belief of Nordic states that hybrid war in the Baltics is the most likely regional 
flashpoint between the West and Russia (Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New 
Administration 2016, pp. 4, 103, 209, 238, 240-241, 360).
Air Force analysis of Baltic security stresses that NATO Air Forces and the U.S. Air Force 
must quickly adapt to evolving strategic and technological realities including planning 
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for air operations against a technologically advanced opponent like Russia. Such planning 
involves defending Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, recognizing that Russia is militarily at 
its strongest point since the Cold War, spreading NATO air assets to secondary airfields 
with pre-positioned fuel and munitions, and recognizing the strategic importance of 
Kaliningrad in relation to Lithuania. It also notes that Baltic region airfields risk attack 
from Russian SU-24 fighters employing precision or unguided air-to-surface ordnance, 
that an SU-24 flying at low-altitude attack profile speed would be over Estonia’s Ämari 
Air Base ten minutes after crossing the Russo-Estonian border, and that Russian Surface 
to Air Missiles (SAM) such as the S-300 and S-400 could acquire and engage aircraft 
over eastern Estonia and Latvia (Clem, pp. 74-86).
Another Air Force assessment produced the following table estimating how many 
Russian air strikes would occur in the first three days of a military operation against the 
Baltics:
Table 4. Potential Russian Air Strikes in the First Three Days of Military Operations 
Against the Baltics
Day Number of Massed Strikes Percent Air Superiority
Percent Support 
Ground Troops Percent Isolate Battlefield
1 2 Up to 70 Up to 30 _
2 1-2 Up to 50 Up to 30 Up to 20
3 1 Up to 30 _ Up to 70 (McCabe 2016, 
p. 69)
This work also hypothesized that primary Russian Air Force missions during an attack 
against the Baltics would include:
• Repelling the first surprise air-missile strike to permit mobilizing and strategically
deploying Russian armed forces and transitioning the government to a wartime
footing.
• Inflicting damage on the enemy’s main body by coordinated defense force operations
against offensive aerospace weapons in flight and against strike forces including
aircraft carriers and enemy command centers.
• Providing air cover and support for defensive military operations to repel enemy land
and naval force invasions.
• Supplying air cover and support for ground units to support their seizing the strategic
initiative by conducting defensive and counteroffensive operations.
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• Reserving the right to use nuclear weapons if the Russian state’s existence is considered
threatened by conventional attack with Russian military doctrine including the
concept that a limited nuclear strike can force an enemy to “deescalate” an attack
(McCabe 2016, pp. 70-71).
Another writer in an Air Force publication stressed that whether or not Russia has 
territorial designs on the Baltic states, it is essential for the West to act to limit Russian 
actions toward the Baltic and elsewhere and that strengthening NATO’s deterrent posture 
is critically important. Specific steps in this regard include ensuring that NATO forces 
can survive and fight in an environment of limited Russian nuclear escalation, increasing 
the active and passive defense of key NATO nodes and assets against conventional and 
nuclear strike, and ensuring the capability to penetrate advanced Russian systems such 
as the S-500 missile (Payne 2017, pp. 17, 19-20).
Since Army forces will bear a significant percentage of the burden in Baltic combat 
operations against Russia, their analyses of this theater of operations are particularly 
insightful. The possibility that the condition of Russian ethnic minorities in Baltic 
states and other former Soviet republics could be used as a pretext for Russian military 
intervention is discussed in the Army’s Military Review journal in 2018 (Sencerman 
2018, pp. 41-49, Thornton and Karagiannis 2016, pp. 331-351). The role of Belarus 
involving its geographic proximity to the Baltics and its occasionally problematic 
relationship with Russia, which may complicate Russian military operations against the 
Baltics, has also been scrutinized in Army assessments (Lanoszka 2018, pp. 75-84).
The U.S. Army has also conducted exercises in the Baltic countries to signal Moscow of 
NATO willingness and capacity to defend its NATO partners. These exercises include 
Operation Saber Strike 2017 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland which served as 
a single tactical action covering operational, strategic, and tactical aspects of war. Saber 
Strike involved a multinational air assault, attack on an objective, and implementing 
forward lines of passage in southern Lithuania while also demonstrating a combined 
force’s ability to executive a decisive tactical action, sequenced in time, space, and 
purpose conjoined with other tactical actions supporting an operational plan aimed 
at creating theater strategic effect. The Suwalki Gap in southern Lithuania, adjoining 
Poland, is a narrow and tough to defend 100 kilometer land gap with forests and marshes 
connecting Lithuanian and Polish border regions with the Baltic countries between 
Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave which could become a combat fulcrum in any 
conflict between NATO and Russia. Its elevation ranges from sea level to 309 meters 
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above sea level, its forests are difficult to navigate due to the high density of rivers, lakes, 
and channels, and a limited road network. The Gap’s temperature ranges from -4.4° C 
in January (reaching as low as -30°C) to a summer average of 17.4°C (reaching as high 
as 34.9°C). This region has been historically contested and fought over by Germany, 
Poland, and Russia during the two world wars (Kemper et al. 2018, pp. 1-13, Geiger 
2017, pp. 1-2, Parafianowicz 2017, pp. 3-20).
Project 1721, a 2017 U.S. Army War College analysis of Baltic security issues, is a 
particularly detailed and insightful analytical compendium on Russian European strategy 
and how to use U.S. landpower to counter Russian aspirations for regional hegemony. 
Written by a multinational collaboration of military professionals, Project 1721 describes 
how Russian strategic interest in the Baltic dates back to the rule of Peter the Great and 
the Great Northern War of 1700-1721 partially symbolized by the transfer of Russia’s 
capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg. This work stresses that any effort desirous of 
providing strategic and operational assurance to the Baltics and deterring Russia must 
include diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) power instruments. 
It also stresses that a successful counter-Russian strategy must incorporate air, cyber, 
land, sea, and space power along with the participation and support of NATO allies and 
partners (Mastriano 2017, Frost 2000).
This work describes Russian objectives toward the Baltics as including building a land 
bridge with Kaliningrad, ensuring full access to and control of the Baltic Sea, restoring 
the former Soviet Union and Russian Federation’s western boundaries, and causing 
NATO’s collapse to restore Russia’s European influence. It maintains that Moscow 
believes a limited intervention or disguised Baltic operation might be worth risking to 
test NATO’s unity, stresses that Russia may use economic, financial, information, and 
political leverage to gain international influence, acknowledges that Russian military 
doctrine considers NATO’s expanding military infrastructure toward Russia as a military 
danger, and that the Gerasimov Doctrine may see Russia employ non-military measures 
to disrupt opposition political decision-making processes and weakening the military 
and political unity of NATO opponents (Mastriano 2017, pp. 42-46).
Recommendations for dealing with Russian threats prescribed by Project 1721 include 
enhancing NATO’s early warning capability by developing a robust and early warning 
Baltic region intelligence capability commanded by a U.S. Army Colonel with extensive 
intelligence and NATO experience; increasing the size, survivability, and mobility of 
Baltic armed forces so they can respond to conventional and unconventional threats 
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to create strategic depth including securing vital infrastructure; Baltic states building 
enhanced special forces capability which is interoperable with NATO special forces 
which are also positioned in ethnic Russian zones to detect and counter Moscow-
inspired separatist movements; building a forward NATO presence in the Baltics 
including stationing one brigade in each Baltic nation to increase Moscow’s difficulty in 
attacking these countries; and holding annual training exercises in the Baltics in which 
forces arrive from Europe and North America to demonstrate a quick response to threats 
to Eastern European countries (Mastriano 2017, pp. 132-136).
An essay in a Marine Corps publication stressed that Baltic security forces must be able 
to credibly deter Russian ambitions, NATO partners must build a security network 
between High North members and partners to enhance efficiencies and ensure unity 
of effort if there’s a military confrontation with Russia, and NATO deterrence being 
designed to a quick Russian victory. This treatise acknowledged NATO’s limited Russian 
attack response time due to the lack of natural boundaries and the short distance 
between Russia and the Baltic states. It stressed that Moscow would use hybrid war and 
provokatsiya (provocation) to achieve objectives short of all-out war; that the west should 
seek to deny Russia a quick victory by recognizing that it will take approximately 10 
days for NATO heavy armor to reinforce the Baltics from Grafenwὂhr, Germany; that 
Baltic populations will bear the initial brunt of casualties and have to use guerilla tactics 
to delay the Russians, and that developing defense layers below the nuclear threshold is 
the best way to deter and defeat Russian aggression (Goldberg 2017, pp. 15-39).
U.S. Navy assessments of Baltic security matters include a U.S. Naval War College 
Russian Maritime Studies Institute (RMSI) translation of Russia’s 2015 Maritime 
Doctrine. Where the Baltic Sea is concerned, the key objectives of this document stress 
Moscow’s intention to:
• Develop coastal and port infrastructure, renew oceanic and riverine lanes for ship
navigation, and develop an undersea pipeline for export and supplying energy to
Kaliningrad;
• Develop military capabilities and the Baltic Fleet’s military installation;
• Develop a fleet capable of achieving national maritime policy objectives; and;
• The Navy working with the Federal Security Service to accomplish national objectives
(Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2015, pp. 18-20).
A 2016 RMSI analysis noted that the Russian threat to the Baltics has increased 
exponentially since 2008, that NATO must develop the ability to decisively break 
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through Russian A2/AD capabilities in Central Europe, and the Baltics, develop 
a robust Baltic Sea naval presence, and factor the Baltic into NATO maritime strategy; 
and that 71% of Naval War College (NWC) faculty rated the possibility of a Russian 
military move against the Baltics as low or very low with 18% of NWC faculty rating it 
as high or very high (Sense of the Faculty… 2016, pp. 2, 9, Lundqvist and Weiden 2015, 
pp. 42-48).
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) stresses that Russian interest in the Baltic dates 
back to the 9th century as part of riverine trade connecting the Baltic and Black Seas, 
the 1703 establishment of Russia’s Baltic Fleet, this fleet’s combat readiness at the onset 
of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and the Baltic Fleet containing the following order 
of battle in 2015: 2 submarines, 2 guided missile destroyers, 1 guided missile frigate, 
6 frigates, 11 guided missile patrol gun boats, 7 patrol gun boats, 4 landing ship tanks, 
and 2 utility landing craft. Russia also possesses a Baltic shipyard in St. Petersburg, 
the F.F. Ushakov Baltic Naval Institute is located in Kaliningrad, and on July 6, 2015, 
Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Chirkov declared that “the nuclear 
submarine fleet is the priority in the navy shipbuilding program.” The importance of 
submarines in the Baltic as a source of potential combat operations and as a gateway 
for Russian submarines desiring to reach the Atlantic remains of ongoing strategic 
importance. A chart accompanying this ONI assessment projected continuing growth in 
the number of Russia’s Baltic Sea Fleet ships to 2030. The May 4, 2018 reestablishment 
of the 2nd Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations whose area of operations will include 
the North Atlantic also demonstrates tangible U.S. commitment to countering Russian 
naval assertiveness (U.S. Chief of Naval Operations 2018, p. 1, U.S. Office of Naval 
Intelligence 2015, pp. xiii, xvi-svi, 16-17, 20, 30, Bruns 2019, pp. 117-132).
policy Research Institution analysis
The Baltic’s increasing importance has been analyzed intensively by U.S. and international 
nongovernmental public policy research institutions since 2014. In 2016, the Center for 
a New American Security (CNAS) conducted an Assured Resolve Exercise simulation 
involving a hypothetical Russian attack against NATO. Assured Resolve found that the 
traditional balance between deterrence, response, and escalation was dangerously offset 
with U.S. and Baltic members being more willing to quickly invoke NATO’s Article 
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5, while other NATO members were more cautious in their response. This assessment 
also found NATO lacks key capabilities to combat Russian aircraft and other A2/AD 
capabilities, and that Finland and Sweden need to decide whether to join NATO and 
how to respond to requests they may receive from the U.S. if Washington and other 
NATO countries react aggressively to Russian aggression (Smith and Hendrix 2016,  
pp. 5, 7, 15-16). 
A March 2018 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis determined 
that Russia imposes three Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) challenges in Northern 
European waters including maritime hybrid warfare involving civilian ships, deniable 
forces including amphibious and light infantry, and Moscow’s well-developed and 
diverse seabed warfare force; cyber and electronic warfare whose advanced capabilities 
can hinder civilian and military information dissemination and gathering; and long-
range strike capabilities including precision munitions and Air Force capabilities in the 
Kola Peninsula and Kaliningrad giving Russia the option of placing them on naval vessels 
in the Barents of White Seas and the capability to strike Northern European targets.
CSIS report recommendations include:
Table 5. CSIS Report Recommendations for Countering Russian Military Capabilities
Creating a Baltic SEA MDA Analytic Center at the Baltic Maritime Component Command in Rostock 
to analyze, collect, diffuse, and disseminate Baltic MDA information.
Develop a training course for military intelligence officers on Baltic MDA analysis best practices.
Integrate subsurface sensors and antisubmarine warfare buoys and associated acoustic processing 
systems.
Acquire significant stockpiles of advanced sonobuoys and associated acoustic processing systems
Create resilient commercial systems capable of reinforcing air and sea traffic relying on radar, GPS, VHF 
radio, and UHF radio systems in the congested Baltic Sea region.
Ensure civil-military collaboration. Northern European nations need to ensure standardized tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for MDA activities between civil and military authorities including evolving 
relevant MDA capabilities to military operational control during a crisis.
Developing capabilities for small signature detection including Russian combat swimmers, amphibious 
special operations forces, and other deniable military capabilities.
Acquiring a range of aerial, surface, and sub-surface unmanned vehicles including aircraft and counter-
mine unmanned surface vessels.
Acquiring mobile air surveillance radar capabilities to maintain persistent coverage of Baltic and North 
Sea airspace.
Utilize emerging space surveillance capabilities with high revisit rates to monitor ship movements 
(Metrick and Hicks 2018, pp. IV, 42-47).
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The 2018 Military Balance report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) notes significant disparity between Baltic countries and Russian military forces. 
Estonian military forces include 6,600 active duty personnel and 15,800 Defence 
League personnel; Latvian active duty personnel number 5,310 and 7,850 reserves; and 
Lithuanian active duty strength is 18,350 and its reserve strength is 6,700. Russia’s 
Army alone includes 280,000 active duty personnel with many operationally based at 
St. Petersburg’s Western Military Headquarters. Russian forces adjacent to the Baltic 
nations are estimated to contain 22 battalions against Baltic and EDI deployed forces 
(Military Balance 2018, pp. 98-99, 122, 124, 192, Shlapak and Johnson 2016, p. 4).
A 2016 report by Estonia’s International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) 
asserted that NATO must deploy a “battalion-plus’ battle group with enablers and force 
multipliers in each Baltic country, that there should be an additional U.S. Army battalion 
in each of these countries, and advocated strengthening NATO’s nuclear deterrent by 
informing Moscow that its using sub-strategic nuclear weapons to de-escalate conflict 
would be a major escalation warranting a nuclear response (Clark et al. 2016, pp. 6-7). 
Protecting power grids from Russian cyberattack and other hostilities by moving Baltic 
country power grids to Nordic or European continental grids was also recommended in 
a 2018 ICDS report (Tuohy, Jermalaviĉius and Bulakh 2018).
The most troubling aspect of Baltic security was demonstrated by a 2016 Rand 
Corporation report documenting 2014-2015 war games on a Russian invasion of the 
Baltics. This assessment maintained Russian forces could reach Riga and Tallinn within 
60 hours and that a bloody counteroffensive with potential escalatory risk would be 
required to liberate the Baltics, and that conceding temporary military defeat would 
have disastrous consequences for the Baltic countries and NATO alliance. Report 
recommendations included increasing NATO forces to seven brigades, including three 
heavy armored brigades sufficiently reinforced with airpower, land-based fire support 
and other enablers could help prevent rapid conquest of the Baltics, and that developing 
this deterrent would have annual costs of $2.7 billion which must be seen in the context 
of annual NATO defense spending exceeding $1 trillion (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 
pp. 1-2).
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conclusions
Recent and ongoing U.S. government and public policy literature and political debate 
recognizes that Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine also applies to the Baltic 
region. All NATO countries must acknowledge the reality that a new Cold War exists 
with a revisionist Russia. The U.S., its NATO allies, and Nordic partner countries like 
Finland and Sweden must accept this inescapable geopolitical reality and bluntly inform 
domestic public opinion that continuing increases in military spending and force 
deployment in the Nordic and Baltic regions will be essential for the forseeable future. 
Continuing military exercises must occur in Poland and the Baltic countries and include 
drills to defend these countries and simulate exercises to capture Kaliningrad and detach 
it from Russia if military conflict occurs. Air forces must continually patrol Baltic skies, 
surface and sub-surface naval forces must continually monitor Russian maneuvers, 
and intelligence capabilities need to be strengthened against Russian active measures 
and provocations across the entire combat spectrum including space. Forces executing 
these countermeasures must be given liberal rules of engagement in the event of hostile 
interaction with Russian or Russian-allied forces (Ringsmose and Rynning 2017,  
pp. 129-146, Götz 2019, pp. 99-117).
These countries also need to strengthen their cyber resilience and critical infrastructure 
resilience to counteract Russian attempts to disable these assets which are critical to 
multiple civilian and military activities. Adroitly responding to and counteracting 
Russian attempts to influence and manipulate p ublic opinion must also be ongoing 
efforts of the U.S. and its allies. Th ere must be continuing development of allied 
ballistic missile defense and precision-guided munitions capabilities to counter ongoing 
Russian military technological advances. Installing anti-personnel land mines in these 
countries Russian border regions should also be considered. The U.S. and its allies need 
to upgrade their military doctrine to emphasize their ability and willingness to take 
decisive measures to defeat covert or overt Russian military and non-military action 
against the Baltics. Ongoing defense spending increases by Baltic region countries must 
be sustained to cope with the continually evolving Russian threat. The June 12, 2019 
announcement that Poland will purchase 32 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and that the U.S. 
will send 1,000 troops to Poland at a White House meeting between President Trump 
and Polish President Andrzej Duda indicates some level of commitment to increasing 
NATO resolve toward Russia
27
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There must be continuing dialogue with Russia to demonstrate western willingness 
to international opinion to keep hostilities from inadvertently breaking out. This 
communication must be coordinated and candid across the NATO alliance and from 
Finland and Sweden to ensure that Moscow does not attempt to exploit potential policy 
differences between these countries. Both Helsinki and Stockholm need to abandon 
their Cold War era morally relativistic neutrality and join NATO as soon as possible 
to enhance alliance diplomatic solidarity and military interoperability. Moscow must 
be repeatedly warned in public and confidential communications that any attempt to 
militarily invade the Baltics or subvert these countries through active measures will 
result in devastating diplomatic, economic, military, and political consequences for the 
Kremlin. Unflinching realism, diplomatic cohesion, and ongoing efforts to develop and 
sustain credible military forces capable of deterring then defeating Russia if military 
confrontation occurs must be hallmark characteristics of U.S. and western policy 
toward Moscow. Overcoming the partisan divisions caused and lingering from Russian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. election presently makes achieving greater Baltic policy 
cohesion extremely difficult. Following many of the recommendations contained in 
the analyses documented in this assessment will be critical if protecting Baltic nations’ 
hard-won freedom and independence is to be maintained. The Baltic needs to rank 
at least as highly in U.S. and NATO strategic calculation as other strategically critical 
regions including China and the Western Pacific, North Korea, Iran, the Middle East, 
and South Asia. Actions over the forthcoming longue durée will determine if the U.S. 
and its allies are successful in defending Baltic freedom and security (Béraud-Sudreau 
2019, pp. 94-122, Hamilton 2019, p. 334-348, President Donald Trump 2019, p. 21).
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